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Introduction 1 Introduction
During the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) in 2015 and its resulting Paris Agreement 195 countries agreed to set out a global action plan to avoid dangerous climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C above preindustrial level. The agreement is based on "bottom-up" Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) being voluntarily imposed, not legally binding and, finally, not enforceable. 1 Recent assessments evaluating the effects of current mitigation policies raise doubts that countries are on track to meet the globally agreed target (UNFCCC 2015b). Consequently, as formulated already in Article 3 of the Paris Agreement, " [t] he efforts of all Parties will present a progression over time [. . . ] " (UNFCCC 2015a) to ratcheting-up and crank up ambition over time. As a dynamic review mechanism, the global stocktake will assess the achievements of parties under the Agreement and its long-term goals every five years, starting in 2023 (Article 14). 2 That is, countries will review, compare and potentially adjust their efforts periodically during the stocktake. In that respect, Article 4.11 states "A Party may at any time adjust its existing [NDC] with a view to enhancing its level of ambition, [. . . ] ". It shows that parties are not required to stick to a particular NDC once submitted but may replace existing policies with alternative approaches. The important point is that while a downward revision of existing NDCs is very likely to provoke stark criticism of the international community, in principal it remains a legally available option under the Paris Agreement (C2ES 2017). Countries' future commitments will therefore depend on their individual assessment of what has been already achieved, both by themselves and the other countries. The status-quo of already achieved emission reductions, may serve as a typical reference point and therefore provide a strong anchor serving either as a commitment advice for strengthening ambition or may be considered as a potential threat to reverse actions being already undertaken by the respective country. In fact, again, while countries are encouraged to increase their ambitions in the stocktake, an adjustment of the NDCs to less ambitious emission reduction targets may also be possible. The decision of the current US government to withdraw from the Paris Introduction Agreement and to reverse policies being initiated by the previous government serves as an example for the latter case. The question is then: Ratchet up or down in the stocktake? To address this question we experimentally investigate the impact of the status-quo on future climate actions with the possibility of increasing and decreasing ambition levels under wealth heterogeneity, i.e., poor and rich countries, in the negotiations. Our experimental design builds upon the canonical public good games (e.g., Ledyard 1995; Chaudhuri 2011) to capture the tension between the individual interest to free ride on contributions of other group members and the joint interest to provide the public good, i.e., the global mitigation target, at a social optimal level. We thereby focus on individuals' pre-existing climate mitigation actions being implemented exogenously. To capture the effect of the status-quo, participants in our experiment choose their actions against the backdrop of these pre-existing mitigation efforts. Previous experimental studies devoted to the global climate tragedy account for preexisting efforts by restricting the choice of players in a way that they can only add on top what has been already achieved (e.g., Milinski et al. 2008; Tavoni et al. 2011; Barrett and Dannenberg 2012; 2014) . By contrast, our experimental design allows both for increasing and decreasing ambition levels compared to the status-quo, most importantly players can undo existing efforts by taking pre-existing contributions from the public good. In case decisions are mutually exclusive (i.e., either only give or only take from the status quo), some studies find that such status-quo framing matters (e.g., Andreoni 1995; Park 2000; Khadjavi and Lange 2015; Gächter et al. 2017) , while other do not observe that it changes behavior (e.g., van Dijk and Wilke 1997; Sell and Son 1997; Cubitt et al. 2011; Dufwenberg et al. 2011; Cox et al. 2013) . A recent such study by Gächter et al. (2017) reveals that differences between giving and taking frames are associated with a decrease in reciprocity in take decisions and the mixed results can be traced back to individual differences in attitudes and beliefs. In a setting where the statusquo is chosen to allows for both, ratcheting up and down pre-existing contributions, van Soest et al. (2016) find that cooperation collapses where participants can give and take compared to a pure giving frame, while Khadjavi and Lange (2015) do not observe differences. However, all these studies do not address heterogeneities between parties, a crucial feature and a major source of ongoing controversies in climate change negotiations. In our experiment we take into account differences in wealth and we divide participants into two groups to reflect the persisting dichotomy between rich ("Annex-I") and poor ("Non-Annex-I") countries in current international climate policy. 3 Even Introduction though the Paris Agreement tries to avoid this bilateral structure, it continues to be of crucial importance to climate change negotiations (Tørstad and Saelen 2017) . Building up on the reference point in a setting with an intermediate public good provision level compared to the standard giving setting with no taking option our experimental design thereby provides a more differentiated view on a potential contribution norm or burden sharing mechanism. Pre-existing provision levels thereby may either serve as a coordination advice (since they might suggest a focal point for a possible contribution norm) or as a potential threat if parties undo climate action already implemented in the past, e.g., if they fear that other group members will contribute too little. Another novelty of our study is that we investigate the impact of the status-quo on future climate actions for the case of poor and rich players, thereby capturing the international dimension of global public goods (e.g., Barrett 2007) by collaborating with the United Nations Youth Associations Network (UNYANET). We recruited 139 individuals from 51 different countries. Wealth heterogeneity was implemented such that group members from a developing country start with a lower endowment than members from developed countries. 4 Our results reveal that starting with pre-existing public goods provision level and allowing both for giving and taking decreases contributions (i.e., additional efforts beyond the status-quo) compared to the standard giving frame. We find that both poor and rich agents contribute around 30% of their disposable endowment to the public good in both settings. However, reducing pre-existing contributions by taking out of the group account appears to be a strong behavioral barrier for the vast majority of participants. Consequently, in our setting, public goods provision is higher when starting with a pre-determined contribution level compared to a pure giving frame. While our experimental results cannot be generalized and inform directly on international climate negotiations, we provide the important insight that the mere existence of status-quo plays an important role for cooperation: The majority of individuals tend to abstain from exploiting or reversing existing public goods provision if they have the opporto taking (see McCarter et al. 2011) . In case participants differ with respect to wealth, it is shown that high endowed subjects are more likely to give to the public good, while low endowed subjects are more likely to take from the public good. While this study provides valuable first insights, the experiment does not include pure giving frame and, therefore, does not allow comparing potential differences in efficiency levels between these two different institutions. 4 One might argue that rather the personal wealth status rather than the wealth status of the respective home country matters for the individual contribution decision in the public goods game. Since delegates in real negotiations typically are expected to represent their countries' views rather than their personal interests, we are confident that assigning players into the different roles based on the economic circumstances of their home country instead of considering personal wealth or income status provides a proper way given to address our research question. Moreover, we control for the personal wealth status in our regression analysis without finding any significant impact of the personal income on the outcome variables.
Experimental design and procedure tunity to do so. These observations might provide support for the basic structure of the Paris Agreement with Nationally Determined Contributions and the possibility to adjust them, even if a downward revision of national targets might not be precluded. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and procedure of the study. Results are presented in Section 3. A concluding discussion is provided in Section 4.
Experimental design and procedure
Our experiment is built upon a standard 4-player public good game. For implementing the status-quo with pre-existing contributions we adopt the design developed by Khadjavi and Lange (2015) for the case of poor and rich parties. We distinguish between two treatment conditions: A pure giving condition (GIVE) without any pre-existing contributions and a condition allowing both for giving and taking of pre-existing efforts (GITA). In both conditions, each group consists of two poor and rich agents. Rich agents receive an initial endowment of 30 tokens tokens, while poor agents receive an initial endowment of 10 tokens. In the public goods game every player has to decide how many tokens to keep for herself and how many tokens to contribute to the group account, reflecting the group climate change mitigation efforts. Each player earns 0.4 token for each token invested in the group account, regardless of whether she contributed to the group account. Under these parameters, it is in individuals' material self-interest to keep the entire endowment in their private account, however, from the group's perspective, it is socially optimal if the entire endowment of all group members is invested into the public account. The only difference between GIVE and GITA is that in the first case the entire endowment is initially assigned to the individuals, and hence the status-quo public good provision is zero. By contrast, in GITA, 40% of the endowment (i.e., 12 tokens and 4 tokens for the rich and poor players, respectively) is initially allocated to the public good. Hence, in this treatment the status-quo of contributions is 40% of the individual initial endowment and players have the opportunity to increase contributions to the public good beyond the status-quo, to maintain the current levels, or even to undo efforts by taking existing contributions (i.e., up to 40% of their individual initial endowment) out of the public account. Given our parameters and assuming standard preferences, the unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is identical in both treatments: Zero public good provision.In GIVE players should give nothing to the public good and, accordingly, in GITA agents are expected to undo existing efforts by taking all contributions out of the group Experimental design and procedure account. 5 To capture the international dimension of the global climate tragedy we conducted the experiment in collaboration with the United Nations Youth Associations Network (UNYANET). 6 The aim of UNYANET is to strengthen the collaboration between its members, the UN and further international organizations, e.g., by organizing Model United Nation (MUNs) sessions. Individual members of the UNYANET network were contacted by the national organizations via email, inviting them to take part in a scientific study on individual decision making conducted in collaboration with UNYANET. The email was distributed via UNYANET's official communication network. Participants were informed that they could earn an additional individual earning depending on their decisions and the decisions of their peers. In addition, participants knew that UNYANET receives a show-up fee of 2 US-Dollars for each participant. Subjects were informed that 10 percent of all participants were randomly selected after the experiment to receive their payment. We did not disclose any further information of the context or the aim of the experiment at this stage of the study. As a first step, UNYANET members who followed the link in the invitation email had to complete an online registration in order to being able to participate in the experiment. During the registration phase, participants had to provide socio-demographic information (age, sex, income, education, religion, nationality, and residence). This information was required to assign high and low endowments to participants from developed and developing countries, respectively. 7 After the registration, participants received an individual email with a unique access code and could take part in the online experiment. 8 Conducting the experiment via the internet offers obvious advantages for our study (e.g., Eckel and Wilson 2006; Horton et al. 2011 ). Most importantly, using the internet enables us conducting the experiment synchronously at different sites what provides the opportunity of comparing individual decisions across regions and countries. 9 In total, 139 UNYANET members from 51 countries followed our invitation and took part in our online experiment. Figure 1 shows the distribution of participants accord-5 Experimental details are provided in the Appendix. 6 UNYANET is the international umbrella organization of the United Nations (UN) Youth and Students associations with members from Europe, Asia, Africa and America. It was founded in 2011 and is seated in Geneva, Switzerland. For further information, see http://unyanet.org/. 7 In particular, the classification into developed and developing countries is done using the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI combines life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators to rank countries according to their human development. Countries with a HDI of 0.7 and above are considered as countries with a high or very human development. Countries a HDI below 0.7 are considered to have a medium or low development. 8 This procedure ensured that each participants could take part only once in the study. 9 We provide the instructions in the Appendix. Afghanistan (7), Albania(1), Austria(18), Bahrain(1), Belgium(2), Bhutan(1), Bulgaria(1), Cameroon(1), China(1), Colombia (2), Croatia(1), Czech Republic (1), Ethiopia(2), Finland(1), France (2), Gambia (7), Germany (16), Greece(1), Hungary (2), India(1), Indonesia(1), Kazakhstan (3), Kenya(2), Kyrgyzstan(2), Macedonia(2), Mongolia(1), Montenegro(1), Nepal(2), Netherlands(1), Nigeria(4), Norway(1), Peru(1), Philippines(1), Poland(1), Romania (6), Serbia (7), Slovenia (3), Somalia(6), South Africa(1), Sweden(2), Switzerland(5), Syrian Arab Republic(1), Tajikistan(2), Tanzania(1), Turkey(1), Turkmenistan(1), Uganda(2), Ukraine(3), United Kingdom(1), United States (3), Uzbekistan (2) ing to countries and the respective economic development. Before entering their allocation decision, individuals were guided through detailed instructions on the procedure, and a set of numerical examples. We use an ex-post protocol to match participants into groups of four players and to calculate group contribution levels and payoffs. 10 The average payment for the selected participants was a purchasing power equivalent to $25 in the respective countries. After the allocation decision, we asked participants to answer questions thereby eliciting their attitudes, e.g., towards trust and climate change.
The characteristics of participants from developed and developing countries are displayed in Table 1 . In both samples the average age is 25, and around 50% are students (no significant differences between the samples). However, the share of female participants is lower in developing countries than in developed countries (36% vs. 53%, p-value: 0.057, Chi-squared test). In addition, participants from developed countries are more likely to define themselves as belonging to a lower income group within their home countries than participants from developed countries (2.86 vs. 3.48, p-10 Groups always consist of two poor participants from developing countries and two rich participants from developed countries. Since our sample does not consist of participants from developing (50) and developed (89) countries in equal parts, we have re-matched participants from developed countries to determine payoffs for all participants. Participants, also those who have been re-matched, have been paid once. For re-matched participants it was randomly determined which group levels have been considered to calculate payoffs.
3 Results Note: "Age" (in years); "Female" (female dummy) "Student" (student dummy); "Income": 1 indicates the lowest and 5 the highest income group in the participant's country, based on self-assessment; "City": grew up in big city (1) to rural village (4); "Trust": % of indicating "Most people can be trusted"; "Importance of climate change protection": importance of fighting climate change: not important (1) to very important (5).
value 0.000, Mann-Whitney U test). As to personal attitudes, we find a a considerable higher trust level (47% vs. 20%, p-value: 0.002, Chi-squared test) for participants from developed countries than for participants from developed countries (47% of the participants from developed countries agree with the statement that "most people can be trusted", but only 20% of all participants from developing countries). Moreover, it appears that participants from developing countries assign a higher weight for the need to fight climate change than participants from developed countries (4.53 vs. 4.88, p-value: 0.004, Mann-Whitney U test). We take these individual characteristics and differences between the two subsamples, which might affect decision behavior, into account by adding them as explanatory variables within our regression analysis provided in the following section.
3 Results Figure 2 shows our results for individual contributions (i.e., efforts beyond the statusquo) and individual provision levels (i.e., including both the status-quo and individual contributions) across treatment conditions. 11 We find that average individual contributions in GITA (4.6 tokens) fall below those in GIVE (7.0 tokens). Regression analyses of the data show that these differences are significant (Table 2 -column 1, p-value: 0.024). While participants contribute less in GITA, the vast majority abstains from undoing pre-existing contribution levels. Only 10% takes out of the public good which suggests that falling behind the status-quo appears to provoke a strong behavioral barrier in our experiment. Further evidence for this argument can be found by focusing on full free-riding behavior. In GITA not a single individual fully free-rides. In GIVE, 4.4% of all participants act purely selfishly (i.e., zero contributions) (4.35% vs. 0.00%, p-value: 0.120, Fisher's exact). By looking at the relative contributions (i.e., % of disposable endowment) we find that participants contribute, on average, around one third of their disposable endowment to the climate account in both treatments GIVE and GITA (32% in GITA vs. 33% in GIVE, p-value: 0.985, Mann-Whitney U test). We now analyse the behavior of rich and poor players separately. Average contributions from rich players in GITA (6.2 tokens) fall below that in GIVE (8.9 tokens) (p-value: 0.071, Table 2 -column 2). But also for them, the possibility to fall behind the pre-existing contribution level appears to be a strong behavioral barrier. 16% of the poor participants decide to undo pre-existing contribution levels. Neither the share of givers (100% vs. 84.0%, p-value: 0.110, Fisher's exact) nor the share of strong free riders (0% vs. 0%) differ significantly across treatments for poor agents. Comparing the absolute reductions in individual contributions for both types between GITA and GIVE (rich: -1.9 vs. poor: -2.6) does not reveal any significant differences in our sample (captured by interaction term GITA x Poor, p-value 0.739, Table 2 -column 2). There is statistical evidence that higher trust levels increases giving, but this holds only for rich players (p-value: 0.001, The private provision of public goods among heterogeneous agents always raises issues on a fair burden sharing, i.e., who should bear the costs of providing the public good? We now compare provision at the group level (see Figure 3 ). Groups in GIVE contribute on average 25 tokens to the public good. The two poor players per group contribute together 7 tokens and the two rich players contribute 18 tokens. Consequently, nearly 28% of all contributions are provided by poor participants and the remaining 72% by their rich partners which shows that participants coordinate on an equalizing redistribution that offsets the initial differences in endowments. This trend is even more pronounced in GITA, where two rich players contribute 12 tokens to the public good and the two poor players contribute 4 tokens. Taking into account the status-quo level (8 tokens for the poor and 24 tokens for the rich players), the overall provision level increases to 48 tokens per group. Therefore, 75% of the total public Note: Each square corresponds to one token contributed to the public good on average per group in GIVE (GITA) on top (below). Squares are highlighted in different colors for different participants (poor participants from developed countries vs. rich participants from developing countries). In GITA, also initial contribution levels are highlighted separately. good level is provided by the rich agents. This is remarkable since rich players' statusquo contribution was already three times higher compared to the poor players' levels. We thus find that an institutional design which builds up on pre-existing provision levels characterizing the status quo-even though the taking option fully ensures cooperation to be voluntarily -generates higher benefits than a pure giving frame even if players differ with respect to their initial wealth.
Results

Figure 2: Individual contributions and provision level across treatments and types of players
Results
Summary and concluding remarks
The Paris Agreement arguably gives new hope to climate change negotiations (e.g., Bodansky 2016) but from a current perspective, it seems insufficiently ambitious to limit the global mean temperature increase to 2°C (UNFCCC 2015b). According to Article 3 of the Agreement, the global efforts to combat climate change at a dangerous level will present a progression over time. As a dynamic mechanism to review the voluntarily implemented NDCs of the different Parties, the global stocktake will as-Summary and concluding remarks sess the achievements of the international community every five years, starting in 2023 (Article 14). As countries will review, compare and potentially adjust their efforts periodically during this process, their future commitments will depend on what has been already achieved. This status-quo reflects an important reference point serving either as a commitment advice for strengthening the ambition or even revising it downwards. We experimentally investigate the impact of the status-quo on future climate actions in a stylized negotiation setting reflecting the persisting dichotomy (Tørstad and Saelen 2017) between rich ("Annex-I") and poor ("Non-Annex-I") countries. Our results stress the importance of the status-quo on cooperative behavior. The analysis suggests that starting with pre-existing mitigation levels can foster aggregate mitigation levels. As an important insight, falling behind the pre-determined status-quo builds a strong behavioral barrier. The vast majority of players tends to abstain from reversing existing mitigation efforts. Of course, our experimental setup reflects only one particular aspect of the global stocktake as a review mechanism, namely its potential to affect players' cooperative behavior via the status-quo. Our results thereby stress the sensitivity of overall climate mitigation efforts for this reference point. Poor and rich agents contribute around 30% of their disposable endowment to the climate account both in a setting with and without pre-determined contribution levels. Consequently, a status-quo comprising 40% of the initial wealth resulting in an increase in overall ambition levels. The possibility to revise contributions later might have led to more ambitious contribution levels initially (C2ES 2017). Given our results, the higher pre-determined contribution levels might indeed result in more climate mitigation efforts. The robustness of this finding against the background of different pre-existing contribution levels, provides an avenue for future research. Finally, whether the global stocktake process fosters the implementation of the Paris Agreement and increases overall climate actions will also depend on a variety of different factors which we did not consider in our experiment including, e.g., strategic behavior over multiple periods, sequential decision making, and an open and non-anonymous discussion about targets and intentions. This provides an interesting and important route for further research. 
Summary Statistics
Experimental design details
The material incentives for each agent i, π i , is given by the following equation:
Where w t i is i's endowment in treatment t,a t i ∈ A t i represents the transfer of i in treatment t, A t i is the corresponding strategy set, h denotes the per capita return to the public good with 0 < h < 1 < hn and e t i is i's initial allocation to the public good in treatment t.We choose n = 4 and h = 0.4. Agents in differ with respect to their initial endowment. Each group consists of two rich agents and two poor agents. rich agents receive an initial endowment of 30 tokens and poor agents, in contrast, receive an initial endowment of 10 tokens. Our experiment design consists of two treatments summarized in Table 4 . Treatments differ in the initial allocation to the public good, e t i , the initial endowment w t i , and the corresponding actions set available A t i . We use a pure giving frame (GIVE) as baseline. In this voluntary contribution mechanism, no initial allocations to the public good are , 30] . In our second treatment, agents can either add to or subtract from the public good. In this giving and taking (GITA) frame, both rich and poor agents made an initial contribution of 40% of their endowment to the public good, i.e., e GITA poor = 4 and e GITA rich = 12. In GITA, the remaining endowments are given by w GITA poor = 6 and w GITA rich = 18 and, consequently, poor agents can decide on transfers between −4 and 6 tokens (a GITA poor ∈ [−4, 6]) and rich agents between −12 and 18 tokens (a GIVE rich ∈ [−12, 18]). Instructions † -Screen 1 -Welcome! Dear [Name], Thank you very much for your interest in contributing to our research. You can start the Online-Study immediately. Prior to participating, please read through the most important information briefly summarized here: -Participation will take no more than 10 minutes of your time. -The study consists of both a decision task and a questionnaire. -You will receive detailed information on the decision task during the study. -All explanations are carried out as described: By "money" we mean real amounts of money which will be paid out. By other "participants" we mean real members of the UNYANET network who participate in this study just like you. Note: Please always use the provided buttons and not your internet browser for navigation. Otherwise a successful completion of the study cannot be guaranteed. Please click "Next" to learn more about the expense allowance.
-Screen 2 - † Explanatory notes are given in square brackets. Please note that we use braces to indicate the alternative wording [DEVELOPED vs. DEVELOPING] and parameters [GIVE vs. GITA] used in the different treatments.
Your expense allowance consists of two parts: For each complete participation, UNYANET receives a fixed amount of 2 US-Dollars. Additionally, an individual payment can be obtained in the decision task. Whether you will receive the individual payment and how much you will get, depends on two factors: (i) Your decision in the study as well as the decisions of other participants. (ii) After all participants have made their decisions, we randomly select 10 percent of all participants who will receive their individual payment. Please click "Next" to learn more about the decision task.
-Screen 3 -
We now start the explanation and the procedure of the decision task. Please carefully read through the following instructions.
Explanation and procedure of the decision task
In this section, you have the chance to determine your individual payment. Who is involved in the study? We create groups of four participants; in addition to you there are three other participants in your group. Members of your group are from a variety of countries. We categorize countries according to the Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Programme. The HDI is a summary of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI divides countries into four different groups. For our study, we classify countries of "very high human development" and "high human development" as developed countries and we classify countries of "medium human development" and "low human development" as developing countries. The decision you will make affects both you and the other members of your group. Therefore, your individual payment will be influenced by both your decision and the decisions of the other group members. Please note, that all other members of your group possess exactly the same amount of information and face the same decision as you do. What is the decision task? During the study your individual payment is calculated in tokens. Subsequently to the study your payment will be converted from tokens into US-Dollars at the following exchange rate: In addition, there are 32 tokens in a joint group account shared by all members of your group.
Your task is to decide on the transfer of tokens between your private account and the group account:
That is how many of the [DEVELOPED: 18] [DEVELOPING: 6] in your private account you transfer to the group account and how many of the 32 tokens you leave in the group account respectively. Your transfer is related to the group account as described below: A positive transfer is a transfer of tokens from your private account to the group account. Respectively, a negative transfer is a transfer of tokens from the group account to your private account. You will be asked to indicate your transfer on a slider as shown below. If you move the slider to the left, you decide to transfer tokens from the group account to your private account (negative transfer). If you move the slider to the right, you decide to transfer tokens from your private account to the group account (positive transfer 
